Functional Immunity of State Officials Before the International Law Commission: The “Who” and the “What by Keitner, Chimène
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
2015
Functional Immunity of State Officials Before the
International Law Commission: The “Who” and
the “What"
Chimène Keitner
UC Hastings College of the Law, keitnerc@uchastings.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation






Functional immunity of State officials before  
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Chimène I. Keitner∗ 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi offers an interesting proposal to merge 
ratione personae and ratione materiae immunity for current and former 
state officials from the jurisdiction of foreign states. He argues that the 
traditional distinction between these forms of immunity ‘demands a 
critical review’ because, in contemporary international practice, both 
types of immunity are rooted solely in the international community’s 
need to protect individuals’ ability to ‘perform duties pertaining to their 
States’ international relations.’ Put boldly: ‘in contemporary interna-
tional law the whole legal regime of personal and functional immunity 
from jurisdiction has only one goal, of a single and unitary nature: that 
of protecting certain specific functions of the State concerning its exter-
nal relations or activities, through the protection of the officials who, as 
a rule, perform those functions.’ In his view, justifications for immunity 
that do not serve this ‘single and unitary’ goal are invalid as both a mat-
ter of legal principle and State practice. 
I find Professor Pisillo Mazzeschi’s argument intriguing, but I do 
not find it persuasive. Most fundamentally, I do not believe the practice 
he cites shows that ratione materiae immunity invariably serves, or 
ought to serve, the same purpose as ratione personae immunity. Perhaps 
this makes me distinctly ‘old school’, but the difference between per-
sonal (or ‘status-based’) and functional (or ‘conduct-based’) immunities 
is firmly entrenched and, in my view, well-founded.1 That said, I agree 
∗ Harry & Lillian Hastings Chair and Professor of Law, University of California 
Hastings College of the Law. 
1 In another context, I have taken pains to clarify the distinction between these 
forms of immunity. See CI Keitner, ‘The Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity’ 
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that ratione materiae immunity does not, and should not, shield indi-
viduals from foreign jurisdiction for any and all acts that are attributable 
to a State. The question is where, and how, to draw the line. 
As its name suggests, functional immunity focuses primarily on the 
‘what’, rather than the ‘who’. The Special Rapporteur has not yet tack-
led the ‘what’ aspect of functional immunity. Draft article 2(e) adopts a 
functional definition of ‘State official’ to mean ‘any individual who rep-
resents the State or who exercises State functions.’2 However, the com-
mentary to draft article 2(e) emphasizes that ‘the definition of ‘State of-
ficial’ has no bearing on the type of acts covered by immunity. Conse-
quently, the terms ‘represent’ and ‘exercise State functions’ may not be 
interpreted as defining in any way the substantive scope of immunity.’3 
Similarly, draft article 5 on ‘persons enjoying immunity ratione materiae’ 
delineates the ‘who’, not the ‘what’, of functional immunity. Draft arti-
cle 5 provides that: ‘State officials acting as such enjoy immunity ratione 
materiae from the exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction.’4 The com-
mentary states that draft article 5 is ‘intended to define the subjective 
scope of this category of immunity’ – that is, the ‘who’.5 Thus, in order 
to enjoy functional immunity for a given act, an individual must be a 
State official who was acting ‘as such’. According to the commentary, 
this phrase ‘says nothing about the acts that might be covered by such 
immunity, which are to be covered in a separate draft article.’6 I take 
this to mean that not all acts performed by State officials with actual or 
apparent authority will necessarily fall within the scope of ratione mate-
riae immunity as defined in future reports. Special Rapporteur Concep-
(2010) 14 Green Bag 2d 61, 63-68, available at <www.greenbag.org/v14n1/ 
v14n1_articles_keitner.pdf>. I previously authored an amicus brief in the U.S. Supreme 
Court case Samantar v Yousuf, the annotated version of which details the arguments 
about functional immunity presented in the course of that litigation. See CI Keitner, 
Annotated Brief of Professors of Public International Law and Comparative Law as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents in Samantar v Yousuf, (2011) 15 Lewis & Clark L Rev 
609, available at <https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/9130-lcb153keitnerpdf>. I have pro-
vided citations to some of my other work on immunity in the footnotes for readers who 
are interested.  
2 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 66th Ses-
sion’ (5 May–6 June and 7 July–8 August 2014) UN Doc A/69/10 231. 
3 ibid 235, para 15.  
4 ibid 236. 
5 ibid 236, para 1. 
6 ibid 237, para 3. 
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ción Escobar Hernández appears to be contemplating a more nuanced 
and context-sensitive approach than her predecessor Roman Kolodkin, 
perhaps in light of many States’ discomfort with endorsing blanket im-
munity, particularly for international crimes.7 
Professor Pisillo Mazzeschi frames his analysis as a critique of an 
overly inclusive ‘who’ in the ILC’s work on functional immunity. Yet, his 
arguments also highlight the potential for the ILC’s work to entrench un-
critically expansive ‘what’. This concern merits close attention, since what 
the ILC has called the ‘material scope’ (rather than the ‘subjective scope’) 
of functional immunity will be the subject of the Special Rapporteur’s 
next report,8 and will likely be delineated in future draft articles.  
I agree with Professor Pisillo Mazzeschi’s observation that three in-
terrelated ideas have been invoked with insufficient scrutiny to support 
an expansive definition of functional immunity:  
– ‘the idea that the immunity of State officials is a necessary corol-
lary of the fact that they act as organs of the State’;  
– ‘the idea that such immunity derives from the fact that the agent’s 
official acts are not attributable to him/her because they are attributable 
only to the State for which he/she is acting’;  
– ‘the idea – at the basis of all the other concepts – that the very 
structure of international law only admits the collective responsibility of 
States.’  
I also agree that international law ‘admits the personal responsibility 
of individuals, and especially of individual State agents, alongside the 
collective responsibility of the State,’ although I do not see this as a par-
ticularly new or revolutionary development.  
I would also add to this list another assumption that has received in-
sufficient scrutiny: 
–  the idea that the burden rests on those seeking to demonstrate an 
exception to immunity for acts performed with actual or apparent state 
authority.  
I will consider each of these assumptions in the rest of this brief re-
sponse. 
7 For expressions of concern with an absolutist approach, see ILC, ‘Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its 63rd Session’ (26 April–3 June and 4 
July–12 August 2011), UN Doc A/66/10 221-24. 
8 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 66th Ses-
sion’ (n 2) 230, para 127. 
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2.  ‘The idea that the immunity of State officials is a necessary corollary 
of the fact that they act as organs of the State’ 
 
The reality that States can only act through individuals does not 
necessarily mean that individuals enjoy functional immunity for all acts 
they perform on behalf of States. In some instances, the individual 
might be acting purely as an organ of the State and thus bear no per-
sonal responsibility for a given act. This explains why individual offi-
cials are not personally liable for most commercial transactions they 
perform on behalf of States, even though States themselves are subject 
to suit under the restrictive theory of immunity. It also explains why the 
ICTY declined to issue a subpoena to a foreign official, since the State, 
not the official, was the actual target of the subpoena, and the ICTY 
lacked the power to sanction the State itself for non-compliance.9 In 
these scenarios, the individual is merely a ‘stand-in’ for the State; the 
State, not the individual, is what might be called the ‘real party in inter-
est.’ This is not the case when an individual official engages in conduct 
for which she also bears personal responsibility. This is not to say that a 
State has no interest in proceedings against its current or former offi-
cials, but simply that the types of State interest at stake when the State is 
the real party in interest and when it is not are distinguishable, both 
conceptually and doctrinally. As the United States Supreme Court rec-
ognized in Samantar v Yousuf, proceedings against individual officials 
do not invariably implead the State.10 
 
 
3. ‘The idea that such immunity derives from the fact that the agent’s offi-
cial acts are not attributable to him/her because they are attributable 
only to the State for which he/she is acting’  
 
The idea that all acts performed under color of law – and not just 
acts such as entering into commercial agreements, signing treaties, or 
9 Prosecutor v Blaskic (Judgment) ICTY-95-14 (29 October 1997) para 38, 
<www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/acdec/en/71029JT3.html>.  
10 Samantar v Yousuf, 130 S Ct 2278 (2010). I explore the reasoning and implica-
tions of the Samantar case in CI Keitner, ‘Foreign Official Immunity after Samantar’ 
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answering subpoenas addressed to the State – are attributable only to 
the State, and not to the individual official, is untenable in the era of in-
ternational criminal tribunals and universal jurisdiction for crimes such 
as torture. It was also untenable in the late eighteenth century, when in-
dividual defendants were sued in U.S. courts for acts performed under 
color of foreign law.11 The ILC recognized this in draft Article 58 of its 
2001 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States, which provides: 
‘These articles are without prejudice to any question of the individual 
responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf of 
a State.’ Such responsibility can take the form of criminal responsibility 
(as evidenced by the ILC’s current focus on immunity from foreign crim-
inal jurisdiction) and may also take the form of civil responsibility in some 
legal systems. Immigration proceedings against individuals who are ineli-
gible for asylum because of internationally unlawful acts committed on 
behalf of foreign states, and the recent rise of targeted sanctions against 
such individuals, also represent manifestations of the international recog-
nition of personal responsibility for certain ‘official’ acts.12  
The idea of personal responsibility has little meaning without some 
realistic possibility that a State official will incur consequences as a re-
sult of her unlawful acts. In this sense, the ‘Kelsenian’ observation (to 
use Professor Pisillo Mazzeschi’s term) that States are legal fictions 
comprised of individuals actually supports the notion, which was cen-
tral to the judgment at Nuremberg, that the effectiveness of internation-
al law depends on the ability to impose consequences on individuals for 






11 I recount the history of these cases in CI Keitner, ‘The Forgotten History of For-
eign Official Immunity’ (2012) 87 New York University L Rev 804, available at 
<www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-87-3-Keitner.pdf>.  
12 I explore this idea in a short draft article entitled ‘Prosecute, Sue, or Deport? Transna-
tional Accountability in International Law’, 164 University of Pennsylvania L R (forthcoming 
2015), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2605108>.  
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4.  ‘The idea – at the basis of all the other concepts – that the very struc-
ture of international law only admits the collective responsibility of 
States’  
 
The existence of individual responsibility under international law 
can no longer seriously be questioned, although its precise nature and 
implications remain underexplored.13 The difficult question is not 
whether individuals bear responsibility, but rather what types of ac-
countability regimes States are willing to support (or at least tolerate). 
Although the ILC has been tasked with examining immunity, the dan-
ger with this exclusive focus is that immunity doctrines may be though 
to bear the entire burden of allocating authority horizontally among 
States over internationally unlawful conduct. Other important mecha-
nisms can and do perform this function, such as prosecutorial discretion 
and jurisdictional limits in criminal proceedings, and exhaustion of 
remedies and forum selection doctrines in civil proceedings.  
Rather than attempting to identify generalizable immunity norms in 
customary international law, it might be advisable to focus on building un-
derstandings about immunity into particular treaties with respect to specif-
ic conduct (as done explicitly in the Rome Statute for the International 
Criminal Court, and arguably implicitly in the Convention Against Tor-
ture), just as other treaties (such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations) explicitly codify the contours of immunity in particular contexts. 
 
 
5.  The idea that the burden rests on those seeking to demonstrate an ex-
ception to immunity for acts performed with actual or apparent state 
authority  
 
Professor Pisillo Mazzeschi rejects a baseline of functional immuni-
ty, concluding that ‘considering the lack of extensive, constant, consoli-
dated and uniform practice, it is difficult to maintain the existence of 
both the diuturnitas and the opinio iuris necessary for the identification 
of a customary norm giving all State officials functional immunity from 
13 Lorna McGregor and I have recently co-founded an ILA Study Group on Indi-
vidual Responsibility in International Law, <www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/ 
study_groups.cfm/cid/1054>, to foster collaborative investigation in this area. 
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foreign civil jurisdiction.’ Although my own approach would focus less 
on who has benefited from ratione materiae immunity and more on 
what type of acts have been deemed immune in various contexts, I 
agree that the proponents of blanket functional immunity should bear 
the burden of demonstrating that such immunity is required by custom-
ary international law. 
Although we have grown accustomed to speaking in terms of ‘ex-
ceptions’ to immunity, the assumption that immunity – rather than ter-
ritorial sovereignty – represents the appropriate baseline should not es-
cape scrutiny.14 Professor Pisillo Mazzeschi cites Ingrid Wuerth’s recent 
work on official immunity.15 Professor Wuerth, like many others, begins 
from a baseline of immunity, and then looks for evidence of state prac-
tice and opinio juris sufficient to override this background norm.16 Pro-
fessor Beth Stephens, by contrast, takes a different approach.17 As stu-
dents of customary international law learn by studying the Lotus case, 
the choice of baseline, and the resulting allocation of the burden of 
proof, often predetermines outcomes. It might be advisable to spend 
more time debating and unpacking our assumptions about baselines, 
and less time debating what may inevitably amount to somewhat dis-
parate practice.  
Given that individual officials’ actions are not always attributable 
only to the state (in perhaps the most elementary example of what we 
now call ‘dual attribution’ or ‘shared responsibility’), the notion that 
state immunity and ratione materiae immunity should always be con-
gruent seems puzzling. Professor Pisillo Mazzeschi’s challenge to this 
presumed congruence has stimulated welcome debate, but my sense is 
that debates about the ‘what’ rather than the ‘who’ will prove more 
fruitful going forward. 
14 I have written on this question in relation to cases in the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the United States. CI Keitner, ‘Foreign Official Im-
munity and the “Baseline” Problem’, 80 Fordham L Rev 605 (2011), available at 
<http://fordhamlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/Vol_80/Keitner_November.pdf>.   
15 I Wuerth, ‘Pinochet’s Legacy Reassessed’ (2012) 106 AJIL731. 
16 ibid 744.  
17 B Stephens, ‘Abusing the Authority of the State: Denying Foreign Official Im-
munity for Egregious Human Rights Abuses’ (2011) 44 Vanderbilt J Transnational L 
1163, 1175-76. 
 
 
